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In November 2002, a flu-like
outbreak caused by a coronavirus
now known as SARS-CoV
occurred in Guangdong Province
in China. In the space of 9 months
the disease traveled to 29
countries, infected 8098 people
and caused 774 deaths [1]. The
SARS epidemic spread with
alarming speed among health care
workers attending SARS patients
(e.g., 112 health care workers at
Prince of Wales hospital in Hong
Kong became infected
contemporaneously), but also
indirectly among residents of an
apartment complex, many who did
not have physical contact with a
clinically ill patient. Although the
epidemic subsided by May 2003,
there is still no clear
understanding of the precise
mode of transmission, no firm
laboratory based diagnostic test,
no vaccine, and no efficient
treatment for SARS [2].
Recently published reports
show that a virus closely related
to the SARS-CoV was discovered
in samples collected in Chinese
food markets from Himalayan
palm civets, raccoon dogs,
snakes, bats and monkeys [3,4],
and that SARS-CoV can infect
domestic cats and ferrets [5]. Yet
unconfirmed results [3,4] imply
that Himalayan palm civets are
one animal reservoir for SARS-
CoV, and suggest that the deadly
SARS-CoV recently emerged from
an animal species.
A fatal epizootic of a related
coronavirus in captive African
cheetahs at Winston Safari park in
the early 1980s may offer
comparative insight into the
prospects for a coronavirus-based
epidemic [6]. The affected animals
died of feline infectious peritonitis
(FIP), caused by a feline
coronavirus (FCoV, also called
FIPV). The presence of a cheetah
coronavirus (Aju-CoV, for
Acinonyx jubatus coronavirus) was
inferred based upon the presence
of FIPV antibodies and the
observation of coronavirus-like
particles [6,7]. In domestic cats
FCoV occurs in two varieties:
virulent FIPV which causes severe
FIPV antibody mediated fatal
disease in about 5–10% of
infected cats, and a subclinical
enteric feline coronavirus (FECV)
infection. Within months of arrival
of the two infected cheetahs to
Winston Safari, other cheetahs in
the park fell ill. Retrospective
serum samples tested for
antibodies demonstrated that prior
to 1982 all cheetah serum were
negative, but within six months of
the Sacramento cheetahs’ arrival,
100% of the cheetahs had
seroconverted, most with titers
>1600 (Supplemental Figure S1).
Ninety percent of the 60 cheetahs
in the park developed disease
symptoms including jaundice,
diarrhea, weight loss, gingivitis,
hepatic and renal pathology. With a
mortality of 60% within 2–3 years,
this was the most extreme
outbreak of coronavirus in any
species recorded.
To characterize the genomic
disposition of the cheetahs’ Aju-
CoV strain, PCR primers based on
alignment of seven coronavirus
gene segments (pol1a, pol1b, S,
M, N, 7a/7b, and 3′UTR), were
used to amplify cDNA from
archived cheetah liver and kidney
tissues collected during the
Winston outbreak. Tissues from
five different cheetahs were
successfully used for amplification
of 439 bp of the pol 1b gene, 405
bp of pol 1a, 316 bp of N-7a, and
187 bp in the 3′UTR region.
Phylogenetic analyses of aligned
virus genome sequences confirm
the monophyly of three previously
discovered antigenic groups of
coronavirus, plus the divergent
SARS-CoV genome (Figure 1 and
Supplemental Data). The cheetah
isolates were nested within a
group of domestic cat viruses
using pol 1a, N-7a and also in a
polyphyletic intermix with the
3′UTR gene segment. The
phylogenetic analyses indicate a
close similarity of the Aju-CoV and
the FCoV strains, suggesting the
cheetah virus is closely related to,
if not indistinguishable from,
domestic cat isolates. The most
likely scenario to explain these
results is that FCoV jumped from
the domestic cat into the cheetah.
Interestingly, the two cheetahs
exported from Sacramento to
Winston had visited the U.C. Davis
veterinary hospital, where many
domestic cat FCoV isolates were
originally isolated, suggesting an
opportunity for cross species
transmission.
Comparisons of SARS-CoV,
FCoV and Aju-CoV reveal
important epidemiological lessons.
First, the virus in cheetahs and in
humans emerged abruptly from
distinct species reservoirs [3,4,6].
Second, in cats, cheetahs and
humans, the viruses are highly
contagious, spreading rapidly
through close quarters in weeks, if
not days. Third, despite these
similarities, there is a clear
difference in age sensitivity. For
SARS, there were virtually no
childhood cases, and the mortality
reaches over 50% in people over
65 or with pre-existing medical
complications [8]. In cheetahs and
domestic cats, mortality is the
highest in neonates, infants or sub-
adults; 85% of cheetah cubs
succumbed to the Winston
outbreak [6]. Fourth, while mortality
among humans with SARS
symptoms and house cats with
FCoV is low, around 5–10%,
cheetahs with Aju-CoV exhibited
the opposite extreme, showing
90% morbidity and over 60%
mortality.
There are two plausible
explanations for the cheetah’s
extreme sensitivity to Aju-CoV.
One is that slight mutational
differences transform a relatively
benign coronavirus strain to a
virulent ‘hot’ strain. Among
coronaviruses this scenario has
been proposed, but not proven,
for the transition of FECV to FIPV
in cats [9]. This hypothesis is less
likely for the cheetahs, as in the
outbreak mentioned above lions
became infected concurrently with
the cheetahs, but developed no
overt symptoms [6]. Also,
experimental transmission of the
Aju-CoV to three domestic kittens
failed to cause disease [6].
Perhaps also relevant is that when
the human SARS-CoV was
induced in domestic cats, they
developed no symptoms [4].
Cheetahs are known as the
world’s fastest land animal but
also for their extreme genetic
uniformity, a consequence of
their escape from extinction
some 12,000 years ago.
Remarkably, unrelated cheetahs
accept skin grafts from non-
relatives, a characteristic of
highly inbred laboratory strains of
mice or rats [8]. The most likely
explanation for the high mortality
in cheetahs is their genetic
uniformity, particularly at immune
genes like the MHC. This may
have rendered the species
susceptible to an emerging
virulent strain that had evolved to
circumvent the defenses of the
first victim. If this hypothesis is
correct, the greater genetic
diversity of domestic cats and
humans may reduce the severity
of the epidemic, and also
contribute to the occurrence of
rare genetically determined
SARS-CoV super-spreaders who
can infect with high virulence.
This explanation emphasizes the
critical role of intrinsic genomic
diversity among immune defense
genes in any fatal epidemic. As
such, the search for explicating
genetic susceptibility
polymorphisms that may inform
prognosis, spread therapy, and
prevention of emerging
pathogens seems warranted,
particularly to anticipate future
episodes of the deadly SARS
coronavirus.
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Figure 1.
Phylogenetic analysis of Aju-CoV pol 1b (439bp) sequences from archived liver and
kidney tissues from cheetahs during the coronavirus outbreak, unrooted maximum like-
lihood tree under the GTR + Γ + I model of sequence evolution (-ln likelihood = 3347.49).
Numbers plotted along the branches indicate bootstrap values and Bayesian posterior
probabilities shown as percentages in the following order: Maximum Likelihood/
Maximum Parsimony/ Minimum Evolution/ Bayesian. The three major coronavirus anti-
genic groups are supported by the genomic data (blue shading and roman numerals).
Abbreviations: human coronavirus 229E (HCoV-229E), canine coronavirus (CCoV), feline
coronavirus (FCoV), porcine transmissible gastroenteritis virus (TGEV), porcine epidemic
diarrhea virus (PEDV), human coronavirus OC43 (HCoV-OC43), bovine coronavirus
(BCoV), porcine hemagglutinating encephalomyelitis virus (HEV), rat sialodacryoadeni-
tis (SDAV), mouse hepatitis virus (MHV), turkey coronavirus (TCoV), avian infectious
bronchitis virus (avian IBV), SARS coronavirus from human (SARS-CoV) and from palm
civet (SZ16). The inset depicts portions of the unrooted maximum likelihood tree for pol
1a (405bp) under the GTR + Γ + I model of sequence evolution (-ln likelihood = 3368.65)
CL, FIP1146, FIPTN406, FIP1683 and UCD1 are FCoV strains from domestic cats.
Cheetah isolates from Winston, Oregon outbreak are indicated as Aju.
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